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ABSTRACT
Wireless local area networks play an important role in our
everyday lives, at the workplace and at home. However,
wireless networks are also relatively vulnerable: physically
located oﬀ-premises, attackers can circumvent wireless secu-
rity protocols such as wep, wpa, and even to some extent
wpa2, presenting a security risk to the entire network. To
address this problem, we propose SecureAngle, a system de-
signed to operate alongside existing wireless security proto-
cols, adding defense in depth. SecureAngle employs multi-
antenna aps to proﬁle the directions at which a client’s signal
arrives, using this angle-of-arrival information to construct
unique signatures that identify each client. With these sig-
natures, we are currently investigating how a SecureAngle-
enabled ap can enable a “virtual fence” that drops frames
injected into the network from a client physically located
outside a building, and how a SecureAngle-enabled ap can
prevent malicious parties from spooﬁng the link-layer ad-
dress of legitimate clients.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—Wireless communication
General Terms
Experimentation, measurement, security
Keywords
Wireless, 802.11, SecureAngle, Angle of arrival
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, wireless local area network connec-
tivity has undergone a transition from a niche service into
an essential utility widely used by the general public. Enter-
prises have rolled out large scale wireless lan across entire
campuses. Many homes with a broadband Internet link are
equipped with a WiFi-enabled router, and most mobile de-
vices now integrate wireless WiFi chipsets, allowing users
easy network connectivity.
However, from a security perspective, wireless aps present
a number of problems. Once a client is connected to a com-
promised ap, an attacker may both eavesdrop on users’ traf-
Copyright is held by the author/owner(s).
SIGCOMM’10, August 30–September 3, 2010, New Delhi, India.
ACM 978-1-4503-0201-2/10/08.
ﬁc and inject traﬃc into the wired network. wlan security
protocols such as wep, wpa, leap, and wpa2 have been
proposed in the past few years, however they have a track
record of being compromised [2, 7, 8]. Furthermore, once
deployed, they are slow to be ﬁxed: six years after wep was
known to be insecure, Bittau et al. reported that a full 76%
of secured aps in London still used it [3].
We propose SecureAngle, a new approach to the above
security problems. Recently, 802.11n aps have begun to ap-
pear on the market equipped with multiple antennas, to im-
plement mimo schemes. On top of the resulting throughput
beneﬁts of mimo, we observe that with the right signal pro-
cessing at the physical layer, a multi-antenna ap can also
measure the diﬀerences in time between an incoming sig-
nal’s arrival at each antenna, and use these measurements to
identify the incoming signal’s angles of arrival (AoA). This
AoA information can then be applied to construct a signa-
ture that is unique to each client and extremely diﬃcult to
forge.
We will investigate two applications of SecureAngle:
Virtual fences. We will investigate restriction of wlan
use to the building containing the ap. This would be ap-
propriate, for example, in an enterprise setting where the
company is contained in a secured building, and it is desired
that only clients within the building be allowed access to the
wlan. For this application, we don’t require the ap to dis-
criminate between two inside or two outside clients, but we
do require that signatures for all clients inside the building
can be discriminated from signatures for clients outside the
building. One reason this may hold is that indoors, there is
more extensive multipath propagation than outdoors.
Address spoofing prevention. Another application of
AoA-based signatures is to detect when a client is spooﬁng
the link-layer address of legitimate stationary clients. Link-
layer address spooﬁng can grant unauthorized access, if the
only method of security is address-based access control lists,
and spooﬁng often forms the basis of more sophisticated at-
tacks against the security protocols we mention above. Our
approach is to require the administrator to manually “cer-
tify” a legitimate client’s signature at some point in time,
and compare all incoming packets’ signatures to the certi-
ﬁed signature. A central challenge here is that signatures
may change to some degree when obstacles in the environ-
ment move, and therefore must be tracked and updated.
There also must be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the cer-
tiﬁed signature and an attacker’s signature so that they can
be discriminated from each other. We hypothesis that AoA
signatures are stable and tractable enough to be of use in
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Figure 1: Floor plan with nodes position marked.
this and subsequent proposed applications, but leave the ex-
act signature speciﬁcation as an open research question.
2. RELATED WORK
Many schemes have been proposed to capture signatures
that characterize wireless clients’ identity and location. The
most widely used physical layer information is received sig-
nal strength (rss) [1, 4]. While readily available from com-
modity hardware, compared to the wealth of information
available at the phy of a multi-antenna sdr, rss is a very
coarse measure of the incoming signal, and is therefore prone
to error if relatively few readings are available. Further-
more, attackers with directional antennas can subvert sys-
tems based on rss measurements [5].
SecureAngle has unique advantages over the above work
because it is very diﬃcult for an attacker to generate a signal
that arrives at the ap from the same directions as another
client without being co-located with the latter. SecureAngle
is the ﬁrst work we are aware of that uses AoA-based signa-
tures indoors, where reﬂections from walls and objects are
relatively strong. Although Wong et al. [9] investigate the
use of AoA information for localization, they stop short of a
full system design and do not address the problem of indoor
multipath reﬂections as we will.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our experimental testbed is setup with a 4-antenna warp
[6] as the ap and Soekris boxes as transmitting clients. The
warp fpga is programmed to support 4x4 mimo reception
at 2.4GHz. ap and four Soekris boxes named N121, N122,
N123 and N124 are marked on the ﬂoor plan as shown in
Figure 1. The 4 antennas of the warp are arranged in a line
with 6.1 cm (half the RF wavelength) separation.
Four Soekris boxes are put in diﬀerent oﬃces and transmit
one by one separately. The warp ap records the transmit-
ted signals and outputs the sampled time domain informa-
tion (both amplitude and phase) for further processing. We
implement the Schmidl-Cox algorithm in Matlab to detect
the preamble of packets and apply the music method to cal-
culate AoA information. Figure 2 summarizes the results
for all clients: the X axis is the ground-truth angle for each
client with respect to the ap’s antennas and Y axis is the
AoA of the strongest incoming signal.
We then force two Soekris boxes to transmit simultane-
ously by turning oﬀ csma/ca. We modify Schmidl-Cox
algorithm to detect overlapped packets even if the second
packet (P2) is weaker than the ﬁrst one. Both packets are
detected and the AoA pseudo-spectrums (likelihood versus
angle) for both transmitters are shown in Figure 3 (upper).
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Figure 2: Estimated client bearing to the ap versus
ground-truth, for each of the four clients.
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Figure 3: Upper: AoA pseudo spectrum (likelihood
versus angle) for two colliding packets (lower)
The two curves in Figure 3 (upper) correspond to the two
packets (lower) from two diﬀerent Soekris boxes. Multiple
peaks on the curve indicate multipath reﬂections in the in-
door environment for each transmission. With 4 antennas,
maximum of 3 peaks can be captured which corresponding
to one direct path and two multipaths.
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